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ADDRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL

8:30 P.M.

ARNESON RIVER THEATER
LA VILLITA
THURSDAY. JUNE 3. 1976
SAN ANTONIO. TEXAS

General Hill, General Summer, Fellow Attorneys General and Friends.
It is a pleasure for me to participate in this annual meet
ing of the National Association of Attorneys General.

I know that

the duties of office differ among you and that our responsibilities
are in many respects distinct.

But we are all quite clearly en

gaged in a co-operative enterprise.

We share particularly, al

though duties differ among us, responsibility for a system of
criminal justice which now is not working well.

While it is

encouraging that the rate of increase in reported serious crime
was cut in half last year, we can hardly celebrate a 9% growth
over a crime rate of record proportions.'

..
the states you represent have

The crime problem is an invitation to leadership which we
must all accept.

Historically,

played the principal role in criminal law enforcement.

This is

appropriate and remains the case today.
The Federal government, however, is also increasingly active
in this area.

The President has recently proposed legislation

establishing mandatory sentences for certain offenses.

The De

partment of Justice has endorsed exploration of the value of
sentencing commissions and evaluations of the termination of the
paroie system.

All of these proposals are aimed at making punish

ment tiare swift and sure, thus making criminal justice more fair
and effective.

Each could be adopted by

ot~er

jurisdictions.

The growing Federal involvement in law enforcement is also
quite evident within the Department of Justice.

When I was in

the Department 35 years ago, there was not a Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration or a major counterpart to the Drug

•

Enforcement Administration.
For the most part these programs are aimed at supporting,
rather than supplanting, state and local initiative.

The LEAA

program, for example, is based on the premise that law enforcement
is and should be primarily a state and local responsibility.

Thus,

LEAA relies principally on block grants, contributing some of the
scarce resources necessary to meet this responsibility.

Recog

nizing that in the Federal system the states are, as Justice
Brandeis described them, valuable laboratories for experimentation,
LEAA is an effort to be supportive of this diversity and

to en

courage new programs which might otherwise not be undertaken.

More

over, through support of organizations such as the National Associ
. ation of Attorneys General, LEAA seeks to assure that we will be
able to share our experiences, while maintaining our autonomy.
As you know, there are those who criticizeLEAA for what
they perceive to be failures or, at least, lack of tangible
success.

Some failure is inevitable.

Some uncertainty is a

necessary concomitant of a program which decentralizes decisionmaking and vests primary "authority in those who are politically
accountable.

Perpetuation of such .a structure is itself a benefit

of the LEAA'program.

I.~

Accordingly, we#should place a heavy burden

of proof on those who wish to convince us to' substitute Federal
'

auditors for this form of accountability.

Moreover, this is an

area which calls for new ventures tailored to the needs of parti
cular communities.

In this sense, if there were no failures,

there would be no successes.
The Drug Enforcement Administration is also designed to
complement, rather than compete with, state and local efforts.
Drug abuse is a pervasive and particularly disturbing problem.
While drug use may initially be a matter of choice -- often made
by those whose judgment is immature -- it can be quickly converted
to an addiction which itself may generate the commission of other
crimes.

Drug abuse

is a problem of national importance which must

be faced and fought in virtually every community.

..
cannot be defeated in anyone community alone.

Yet drug abuse

The street sale of drugs is the end result of sophisticated
international operations.

Some criminologists believe

tha~unless

it is attacked at its 'source, disrupting major trafficking net
works, successful prosecutions do no more than open up attractive
opportunities for other criminals.

Thus, the Drug Enforcement

Administration, with national jurisdiction, is an essential ele
ment in the national drug law enforcement effort.

Its potential

cannot be realized, however, without close cooperation with state
and local law enforcement agencies.
For example, a North Carolina woman last year found a bag
of powder.

The local police turned it over 'to DEA which identified

it as heroin.
bag.

In addition, a palm print was discovered on the

DEA was able to trace it to an individual in Jack's bar

in Bangkok, Thailand.

Working with eight North Carolina local

agencies, the state police, the North Carolina Board of IntelligenCE
and law enforcement officials in Georgia, Virginia, Maryland,
Illinois, and California, DEA developed the case into the
seizure of $100 million worth of heroin and 14 arrests.
must endeavor to make this experience more common.

We

We will be assisted in this effort by improved coordination
of drug enforcement resources.

As you know, many years ago there

was relatively little drug enforcement activity on the part of
state and local governments, except in large urban centers.

There

fore, Federal drug agents routinely operated wherever drug traffic
appeared and the evidence of drug addiction was clear.
Today, however, the situation is quite different.

There

are now ten times more state and local officials assigned to drug
enforcement than federal agents.

State and local officers are

increasingly well trained and highly effective.

Thus, it is now

unnecessary and undesirable for the Drug Enforcement Administration
to displace state and local efforts to develop local cases.

In

view of this, DEA should focus its efforts on matters which ex
tend beyond any

~ther

law enforcement jurisdiction.

To make this allocation of responsibility work requires
proper sharing of informants, intelligence and other resources
by Federal. state and local officials.

I realize this sharing

must take into account the needs of local as well as federal
enforcement.

It is also true, and we might as well recognize it,

that not all information can be shared.
procedures to work out.

So we have problems and

DEAts new Administrator. Peter Bensinger,

has recently noted that Federal, state and local task forces, such
as those in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago can be a valuable
asset in this regard.
Effective drug enforcement would also be promoted by the
development of more formal, though flexible, understandings on

appropriate Federal, state, and local role in prosecuting drug
cases.

Individuals who violate Federal drug laws usually are

also violating state statutes.

Uniform national standards re

lating to prosecution of drug cases are difficult. if not im
possibl~to

develop because of

areas of the country.

varyin~

conditions in different

We have, however, asked the United States

Attorneys to work with you and your local counterparts to develop
appropriate guidelines suited to the jurisdictions in which you
share responsibility.

The guidelines should be designed to assure

that investigative and prosecutorial priorities are compatible and
that offenders who are apprehended do not find any cracks through
which to slip in our Federal system.

The Federal-State law en

forcement committees which exist formally or informally in 20
states would be ideal forums for developing these standards;
matters such as this, indeed, suggest the special value of these
committees.

We look forward to working with you in doing so.

As you are aware, there are occasions when we find ourselYes
in our official capacities, on opposite sides of the table.

In'

the civil rights area legislation has expressly authorized Federal
involvement in certain state matters regarding employment, educa
tion, voting, and the expenditure of Federal funds.

As the people

of San Antonio know, this Federal activity extends to substantively
reviewing all changes in the law which might conceivably have the
purpose or effect of abridging the right of some citizens to vote
in certain areas of the country.

While history has made such

measures seem appropriate, .they are quite clearly inconsistent
with the principles of separate spheres of responsibility and
comity which are the philosophical foundations of our Feder&l
system.

The Department of Justice attempts to discharge its

duties under these acts fully, but,
to their extraordinary implications.

+ trust,

with a sensitivity

'

Occasionally, our mandate raises rather peculiar questions.
Last year, for example, we had to consider whether bilingual
ballots were required for an Indian tribe in Virginia whose members
all spoke English and whose other language was unwritten and vir
tually extinct.

After due deliberation we decided they were not.

More often, however, these efforts include more serious problems,
particularly when the Federal courts become the mechanism for the
federal presence in matters normally reserved for state
governments.

and local

We all know this sometimes causes friction.

But

even in these situations we cannot help but be aware that ultimately
our aims must be the same or compatible.
Our problems are interrelated and our responsibilities are
interdependent, particularly, in the effort to reduce crime.

Be

cause this is true I propose to 'emphasize one facet of our needs
and our cooperation, namely the sharing of criminal data and
statistics.

There is an obvious need for improved criminal jus

tice information systems.

Yet fear of misuse and invasions of

privacy make them difficult to discuss, let alone develop.
As many of you know, the FBI proposed several years ago to
alter the operation of its computerized criminal history program.
Much of the debate on this proposal has

b~en

highly emotional,

often starting with charges of "Big Brother" and ending with counter
charges about "Red Herrings. H

It is more disappointing than sur

prising that the questions raised by the proposal are yet to be
authoritatively resolved.

An improved capacity to retrieve and exchange criminal

history information would, unquestionably, be valuable to every
element of the criminal justice system.

If special attention is

to be given the career criminals, we have to know who they are
and quickly.

Better information would help in investigations,

plea bargaining

under appropriate safeguards, setting bail,

sentencing and considering parole.
In addition, some of this information is of obvious interest
to employers, both public and private.

It is understandable, for

example, that a college would like to know, as one in the District
of Columbia did not, that it is a convicted rapist who has applied
for a job as a security guard in a girls' dormitory.
Yet, if past error already paid for can follow an individual
for the rest of his life, threatening employment opportunities and
his acceptance in the community, our hopes of rehabilitating offend
ers through improved correctional services will be severely diminis
Furthermore, there is obvious unfairness in the dissemination of
criminal records which are inaccurate or incomplete.

Arrests of

innocent individuals can have a haunting effect if widely dis
seminated and are

par~icularly

punishing if they show only an

arrest but not a favorable disposition.
The tension in this area is not simply between the needs of
the administration of justice and the interests of personal pri
vacy.

As members of the media avidly argue; there is a strong

public interest in information 'which may conflict with an in

dividual's interest in confidentiality.

Sealing or destroying

records harmful to an individual may also conceal police abuses;
res tricted acces s to old records may help the average offender
to adjust to a normal life, but also enable a political candidate
or public official to escape examination of his past.

There are

competing interests and values which have to be balanced.
The hard questions presented in
not new.

~

area, of course, are

But the development of computerized criminal justice

information systems gives them added urgency.

Computers facilitate

the centralization of information regarding individuals and afford
broader and faster access to it.

Thus, they can contribute to the

achievement of speedy trials, equitable sentencing, and punishment
which is more swift and sure.

In the process, however) the com

puter eliminates what many have viewed as the primary protector of
personal privacy -- inefficiency.

S'enator Sam Ervin expressed this

view in 1974 when he said:
If traditional Government record-keeping prac
tices and record policies have not yet posed an
intolerable threat to personal privacy or reputa
tions, it is only. because of the benign inefficiency
of these file draw systems.

Until very recently,

significant amounts of information were not collected
on individuals and therefore were not available to
others.

Use of information collected and kept on a

decentralized basis ,is slow, inefficient, and frus
trating.

It requires an immense effort'to collect

information on a specific individual from a
variety of different agencies and then to have
it sent out to the agency requesting it.

It is

ironic but true that what has thus far saved much
of our privacy and our liberty has been the com
placency, inefficiency, and interagency jealousies
of the Government in its personnel.
It is apparent, however, ,that inefficiency is no longer an
adequate safeguard.

We must face up to hard questions requiring

resolution.
Our prop1ems have to be met with or without legislation.

In

the absence of controlling legislation, for example, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided that the FBI has a
duty to prevent dissemination of inaccurate criminal records and
must take precautions to prevent inaccuracy and correct its records.
Tarlton v. Saxbe,S07 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

The court ex

pressed some reluctance in doing so, however, stating:
We would welcome legislative action to meet
these issues. . .

The Congress has at its dis

posal the Inecessary] resources and fact finding
apparatus . . . Furthermore, Congress is the appro
priate institution to determine whether established
common law and constitutional interests should be
limited in the service of other important interests.

In a limited way, Congress acted in this area.

The Omnibus

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1973 requires LEAA to promu1
gate regulations to assure the privacy and security of information
contained in manual and automated criminal justice information
systems which it funds.

Specifically, the Act requires that infor

mation in LEAA-funded systems include dispositions with arrest
data; be kept current and secure; be utilized only for law enforce
ment and other lawful purposes; and be accessible to the individuals
whose records are included for review and correction.
In 1975, the Department of Justice promulgated the required
regulations, stimulating a renewed discussion on the proper balancing
of competing interests and, particularly, on the appropriate roles
of the Federal and state governments.
The LEAA regulations recognize that the interests of personal
privacy and law enforcement are both served by records that are
accurate and complete.

Thus, as contemplated by the statute, they

require prompt reporting of dispositions, prohibit dissemination
to non-law enforcement agencies of arrest records without disposi
tions which are more than one year old, and provide a right of
access to an individual who wishes to inspect and correct his
criminal records.

Recognizing that state records may have been

disseminated, the regulations place the responsibility for their
correction in the originating agency and require that it notify
all recipients of the correction.
Two provisions of the regulations directly called into ques

tion the degree of discretion which the Federal government ought

to leave to the states.

As you know, in order to protect the

computerized records from unauthorized access, and with the
strong support of the FBI, the regulations originally required
that all automated systems funded by LEAA be "dedicated" -. that
is used •• exclusively for criminal justice purposes.

Many of you,

along with other representatives of the states, protested this re
quirement.

It was asserted that dedication is not the sole effec

tive means of protecting computerized records, is inconsistent
with programs to which some states are already committed, and is
unduly expensive and wasteful.
found these views compelling.

Upon further consideration, we
While the Department still be

lieves that dedication is the preferable means of securing com
puterized criminal history data, the LEAA regulations have been
revised to permit each state to establish its own procedures for
protecting such information.

Moreover, to achieve consistency of

Federal policy in this area, the FBI is now conforming the condi
tions for participation in the National Crime Information Center
to this approach.
Somewhat similar questions were raised regarding acceptable
means of determining the appropriate extent of dissemination of
state criminal records to individuals or organizations outside of
the criminal justice system.

It is our belief that these decisions.

should be made by politically responsible officials at the state leYe
rather than by the law enforcement organizations which maintain the
records, the potential users, or the Federal government.

There

fore, the Department regulations require that each state shall,
on the record, by its own statute or executive order, decide
for what government and private purposes criminal records ought
to be availab le .
In view of the importance of this question, the regulations
originally prohibited any dissemination not expressly authorized
by statute or executive order.

This provision was intended to

compel careful, formal attention to this issue.

As many of you

persuasively pointed out, however, this approach is inconsistent
with that of the open record laws enacted by 45 states.

These

generally provide that all records are to be considered public
unless expressly made confidential.

We have revised the Depart

ment's regulations to conform with these strong statements of state
policy.

Nevertheless, I trust you will agree, that the unique

problems involved in the dissemination of criminal records do
require independent consideration.

Inattention to these problems

will only greatly increase public concern.
Regardless of where the limits on access are set, it is impor
tant that they be observed and enforced.
of accountability.

Basic to this is a system

Accordingly. the Department regulations require

that LEAA-funded systems, whether manual or automated, include
maintenance of records.

The individual who has made each entry,

the recipient of each record and his reason ~or receiving it must
be shown.

Regular audits to assure that limits on dissemination

are being observed must be made and there are sanctions for
abuse, including fines and termination of funding.
The computers which contribute so much to the apprehension
about abuse of criminal records can provide the best protection
for them.

For the required record-keeping, audit trails, and

corrections procedures present a formidable human task, but these
can be much more easily and reliably programmed into a computerized,
system.

The computer should be recognized as a potentially power

ful ally of privacy interests.
There is one important issue not resolved by the Department
of Justice regulations.

This involves the interstate exchange

of computerized criminal histories.

The mobility of criminals

has long made it desirable that law enforcement organizations be
able to make a single inquiry to determine whether an individual
has a criminal record in any other jurisdiction.

Since 1924. the

Federal Bureau of Investigation has rendered this service through
its Identification Division.

As you know, this Division provides

a central depository for over 21 million arrest fingerprint
from which are derived the criminal histories known as "rap sheets.
It has become increasingly apparent that the value of
history information is greatly enhanced if it is readily accessible
In 1970, with the advice of several interested, outside groups,
the Attorney General authorized the Bureau to include a computer
ized criminal history program as part of the National Crime Infor

mational Center.

Information available in days or weeks from

the Identification Division could be obtained in minutes if in
eluded in the CCH program.
Although the program was intended to be ultimately decentral
ized, it was necessary to begin by collecting duplicate, computer
ized criminal histories in Washington.

Since the inception of

the program, the FBI has received approximately 800,000 records
from 8 states.

Cost and the continued availability of necessary

services from the Identification Division, among other factors,
have discouraged broader state participation and proportionally
limited the immediate value of the computerized criminal history
program.

To facilitate fuller state participation, the FBI several

years ago proposed to decentralize the computerized criminal his
tory program by returning the records of offenders arrested only
in a single state -- amounting to 7010 of the computerized criminal
history records -- to the states which originated them.

The Bureau

proposed to maintain only the records of Federal and multi-state
offenders and an index of the
by the states.

c~mputerized

records maintained

In order to implement this proposal, the Bureau

requested from the then Attorney General the limited authority
to switch inquiries-- or messages -- from the requesting state to
the state in which the index indicated a relevant criminal record
was maintained.

This proposal was pending when I became Attorney

General in February, 1975.

It has evoked one of the most heated

controversies of my tenure.

It has sometimes been hard to

hear the words because of the strength and confusion of voices.
Advocates of the program argued, correctly, that the pro
posal would decentralize records and return them to the agencies
responsible for keeping them up to date, thus promoting accuracy
and completeness.

The message switching capability would also

permit the Bureau to check the accuracy of information in the index
before disclosing it.

Moreover, it would enhance the control of

each state over its own records, permitting· it to distinguish
if it wished among other states which might request a record.
Critics of the proposal generally did not address the details·
of the proposal.

Some were critical of the concept of exchanging

computerized criminal histories as such.

Others objected to the

Bureau's proposed role, .expressing the fear that authorization of
limited message switching would give the FBI a capacity to monitor
all criminal justice communications.
Some of this criticism reflected a measure of misunderstand
ing about the proposal.

But it also reflected a genuine concern

about the privacy of criminal justice information and the role of
the Federal government in law enforcement today.

It has been my

view that it is important that the questions raised by the FBI
proposal for limited message switching be authoritatively resolved
before a final decision is made.

Thus, in accordance with a re

quest by Congress, I decided to defer this

~ecision

until legis

lation regulating the program was enacted.

We have been dis

appointed that despite our efforts, and the efforts of Congressional
committees, such legislation does not seem imminent.
In view of the difficulties encountered in realizing the
potential of the CCH program, the Bureau has now requested permis
sion to terminate it.
Department.

This request is now being studied by the

Judging by the mail, it appears to be as contro

versial as the request for limited message switching authority.
The final decision will be difficult because of the potential
value of the computerized cl:iminal history program, and parti
cularly, because of the steps which

some states have taken in

reliance upon the development of a national program.
You may be assured that the Bureau's proposal to terminate
its computerized criminal history program does not represent a
decline in its willingness to render important services to state
and local criminal justice systems.

The Identification Division,

which is itself becoming increasingly computerized, will continue
to be the primary provider of criminal record services nationally.
The proposal does reflect, however, the understanding that the
real value of a computerized

history program cannot be

crim~nal

achieved without a broadly acceptable resolution of the questions
the FBI program has evoked.
If the Bureau's request to terminate its program is granted,
perhaps a decentralized

compu~erized

criminal history program will

be implemented by another institution.

However, ·the hard questions

being asked about the FBI in this area must be addressed to and by

any other candidate for the responsibility

This is to say there

must be high assurances of accuracy and accountability.
The FBI's proposal to terminate its computerized criminal
history program gives added urgency to the compelling need to
thoughtfully, but decisively establish a national policy regarding
criminal justice information systems.

The Department of Justice

has proposed legislation which would authorize message switching
and, like the regulations, give substantial discretion to the
states to determine the permissible use of criminal justice infor
mation.

An alternative measure would prohibit message switching

and more substantially preempt state discretion by strictly limit
ing

th~

use of such information.

Regardless of how these questions are resolved, legislation

i

. f

is important.

I believe its content can be influenced· by how re
"f.)

sponsibly we deal with the issues we

,

..;

now address in its ab

mu~t

~

'"
~

sence.

We should be encouraged in our efforts by the understanding'i

that there is no single, perfect solution.

with the Department of Justice regulations suggests, this must
be an evolutionary process.

i

As our experience

But we must speed our progress.

j

:1

i

:!ij
"

Cr~e

is at an intolerable level.

The victims of crime will

be ill served if in seeking our common goals we unnecessarily compete, rather than co-operate, or if we

pe~it

inevitable contro

versies to prevent us from making difficult decisions together.
Federalism, after all, is important.
ventions of our Constitution.

It is one of the great in

And we have a strategic opportunity

1

and responsibility to make Federalism work.
pledge you my continuing support.

To that end, I

